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AT&T and the Antitrust Laws:
A Strict Test for Implied Immunity
In a major antitrust suit recently filed against American Telephone
and Telegraph Co. (ATkT),' the United States alleges that AT8&T
has monopolized the markets for telecommunications equipment and
services2 in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.3 The Government is
seeking to separate AT&T's operating companies, which provide prin-
cipally intrastate telephone and other telecommunications services,
from its Long Lines Department, which provides interstate services
and interconnection between the operating companies.
4
The Government is attempting to restructure an industry heavily
regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). As a
result of the suit, the court and the Commission will be engaged in
overlapping factual inquiries under different statutes embodying dif-
ferent legal standards; the suit threatens to interfere with the Com-
mission's efforts to formulate and implement regulatory policy in the
communications industry. This threat of interference is clearest in the
most important submarket of interstate telecommunications services-
intercity voice and data transmission.5 This Note argues that in this
submarket the conduct challenged by the Government is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the FCC and is therefore immune from the
antitrust laws.
1. United States v. AT&T, Civil No. 74-1698 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 20, 1974).
2. Complaint at 11-15, United States v. AT&T, Civil No. 74-1698 (D.D.C., filed Nov.
20, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Complaint]. This Note does not discuss the claim of mon-
opolization in the telecommunications equipment market.
3. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Supp. Feb. 1975) provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony ....
4. Complaint, supra note 2, at 14-15. The Government also is seeking divestiture of
AT&T's manufacturing subsidiary. Id. at 14. For a description of the Bell S)stem, see
M. IRWIN, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 24-27 (1971).
5. For a definition of this submarket for antitrust purposes, see note 70 infa. This
Note does not discuss the Government's allegations concerning AT&T's conduct in two
secondary submarkets for telecommunications services-video program transmission and
mobile telephone service.
AT&T and the Antitrust Laws
I. The Doctrine of Implied Immunity
A. Reconciling Antitrust and Regulation
The accommodation of the antitrust laws and economic regulation
has troubled courts since the earliest applications of the Sherman Act.,
Broadly speaking, the Act seeks to prevent "undue limitation on com-
petitive conditions"; 7 it is premised on the theory that "the unre-
strained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation
of our economic resources." s The theory of regulation, on the other
hand, is that the "unrestrained interaction of competitive forces" in a
particular industry will not adequately serve the public interest.9 Con-
gress therefore establishes a regulatory agency to supervise the conduct
of firms in the industry according to a generalized concept of the
"public interest"'0 which embodies no necessary preference for com-
petition."' Subjecting a regulated firm to antitrust liability raises the
danger that conflicting standards of conduct may be imposed on the
firm by the court enforcing the competitive mandate of the antitrust
laws and by the federal agency enforcing its view of the public interest.
Any attempt to resolve this conflict must begin with the antitrust
and regulatory statutes themselves. In some industries, Congress has
perceived the potential for conflict and has granted immunity from
the antitrust laws for certain conduct by regulated firms.' 2 Where
6. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (rate
agreement among railroads, approved by Interstate Commerce Commission, held subject
to antitrust laws).
7. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
8. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). The Act was also intended
to serve the noneconomic goal of providing "an environment conducive to the preserva-
tion of our democratic political and social institutions . . ." by preventing massive con-
centrations of industrial power. Id. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (Congress "not necessarily actuated by economic mothes
alone" and may have preferred a system of small producers for "indirect social or moral
effect").
9. See 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REcULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 1,
4-5 (1971). For example, the relevant market may be one of natural monopoly which
cannot efficiently support more than one firm; market imperfections may prevent the
competitive process from producing goods of optimal quality, quantity, and price; or
desired policy objectives other than those associated with competition may not be
achieved. C. KAYSEN 8 D. TURNER, ANTITRusT POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
189-90 (1959).
10. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1970) (FCC may order a common carrier to inter-
connect with another if in "public interest"); id. § 201(b) (rates and practices must be
"just and reasonable"); id. § 214 (no construction or extension of lines unless for "public
convenience and necessity"); Loevinger, Regulation and Competition as Alternatives, 11
ANTITRUST BULL. 101, 128-34 (1966).
11. See, e.g., FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 92-95 (1953); Hawaiian
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 775-77 (D.C. Cir. 1974); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 141 (1965).
12. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1970) (merger of telephone companies, if approved
by FCC, is exempt from antitrust and other conflicting federal laws).
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Congress has failed to resolve explicitly the potential conflicts between
antitrust and regulation, a court faced with an antitrust claim must
attempt to infer congressional intent from statutory language and
legislative history.' 3 Because these often provide little guidance, the
courts have been forced to develop their own standards for making the
accommodations between federal regulation and antitrust.' 4 The re-
sult of these efforts at accommodation has been a judicial doctrine
under which an antitrust claim against a regulated firm will be dis-
missed if the conduct challenged has an "implied immunity" from the
antitrust laws or, equivalently, is within the "exclusive jurisdiction"
of the regulatory agency.15
B. A Strict Test for Implied Immunity
The reasoning by which a court decides a particular claim of im-
plied immunity is often only implicit in its opinion. In Gordon v.
13. See Handler, Regulation versus Competition, 43 AN-rzRusr L.J. 277, 282, 285
(1974). For example, in a number of cases involving the Agricultural Marketing Agree-
ment Act of 1937, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246, as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602, 608a-608d, 610,
612, 614, 624, 671-74 (Supp. III 1973), and the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 291, 292 (1970), the Court has found that the statutory language and legislatihe his-
tory clearly indicated that Congress intended the antitrust laws to be applicable to the
conduct at issue. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 389-96 (1967);
Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 464-67 (1960);
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 199-206 (1939).
14. Handler, supra note 13, at 281. The courts have made an accommodation of a
different sort between state regulation and the federal antitrust laws. In Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943), the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act was not in-
tended to apply to "state action." The Parker doctrine has established an implied anti-
trust exemption for conduct authorized or compelled by a state regulatory scheme. Sce
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975); commentary cited in Note,
Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164, 1166 n.18 (1975). The Palher
doctrine is outside the scope of this Note, which is concerned only with inteistate, and
therefore federally regulated, telecommunications services.
15. The concept of "exclusive jurisdiction" should be distinguished from that of
"primary jurisdiction." An agency has primary jurisdiction over a claim "%%hene'er en-
forcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues wl~ich, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administratie body .... "
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956). 'Before decidiug the case,
the court refers it to the relevant regulatory agency for specific findings of fact or findings
of law under the regulatory statute. McGo ern, Types of Questions Over Which Ad-
,ninistrative Agencies Do Not Have Primary Jurisdiction, 13 A.B.A. ANmnLRUsr SicfrIo,
57, 62-63 (1958). In contrast, where the agency is found to hale exclusive jurisdiction
over the conduct at issue in the case, the court will dismiss the claim. See Pogue, E\-
clusive Jurisdiction, 43 ANTITRUSr L.J. 313, 318 (1974); Handler, supra note 13, at 282.
Nevertheless, some authors collapse the two doctrines and use the term "primary juris-
diction" to refer to both. See, e.g., Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037,
1037-38 (1964); von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine
of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HARv. L. REV. 929, 932 (1954). For discussions of this term-
inological confusion, see Stokes, A Few Irreverent Comments About Antitrust, Agency
Regulation, and Primary Jurisdiction, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 550-60 (1964); Com-
ment, New Twists on Old Wrinkles: Primary Jurisdiction and Regulatory Accommodation
with the Antitrust Laws, 15 B.C. IND. & Cost. L. REV. 80, 92-94 (1973).
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New York Stock Exchange1" and United States v. National Association
of Securities Dealers (NA SD),'7 the Supreme Court recently upheld
immunity defenses to allegations of price fixing, concerted refusals to
deal, and resale price maintenance in the securities industry, where
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had specific authority
to approve the conduct challenged in the suit. The Court apparently
assumed that Congress must have recognized that it was allowing the
SEC to approve per se violations of the antitrust laws."8 In cases such
as the Government antitrust suit against AT&T, however, a broader
range of conduct is at issue, and the alleged antitrust violation is
more complex. In such circumstances the Court's willingness to find
immunity has turned on whether the defendant is subject to regula-
tion which is sufficiently "pervasive."' The logic of this inquiry
appears to be that if Congress has invested a regulatory agency with
pervasive authority over an industry under a discretionary public in-
terest standard, it must have determined that competition alone was
inadequate to vindicate the public interest. Therefore, Congress must
have intended to exempt the regulated firms from the competitive
standard of the antitrust laws, at least when the matters at issue in
the antitrust suit are within the agency's authority.
2 0
It is difficult, however, to give the doctrine of implied immunity
any precise analytical content. The leading cases apply conclusory
labels to discrete fact situations, stating on the one hand that im-
munity is implied only in cases of "plain repugnancy" 2' between the
16. 422 U.S. 659, 682, 691 (1975) (upholding summary judgment for defendants
in class action against major stock exchanges and their members alleging that the system
of fixed commission rates for certain transactions was in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act).
17. 422 U.S. 694, 729-30 (1975) (upholding dismissal of complaint alleging a com-
bination by association of securities dealers and others to restrict the sale and fix the
resale prices of mutual fund shares in secondary market transactions). For a discussion of
Gordon and NASD, see Note, SEC Regulation as a Pervasive Regulatory Scheme-Implied
Repeal of the Antitrust Laws with Respect to National Securities Exchanges and tle
NASD, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 355 (1975).
18. See Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 681-82 (1975) (Court notes that legislative per-
mission for fixing of commission rates under SEC supervision occurred seven years after
the Court's decision in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), de-
claring price fixing a per se violation of the Sherman Act.) This logic is more ex-
plicit in the lower court opinion in Gordon. Gordon v. NYSE, 498 F.2d 1303, 1307 (2d
Cir. 1974).
19. E.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 730 (1975)
(with respect to horizontal conspiracy count); Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 347 (1963);
California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962); United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 350 (1959).
20. See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 732-33 (1975);
Foremost Int'l Tours, Inc. v. Qantas Airways Ltd., 5 TRADE RFG. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.)
60,578, at 67,535 (9th Cir., Oct. 22, 1975).
21. United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 351 (1963), quoted with
approval in, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 217-18 (1966).
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,antitrust and regulatory statutes, and on the other that it is implied
to keep federal agencies "free from the disruption' 22 of conflicting
antitrust judgments. Factors relied upon in one case are ignored al-
together in others.23 Commentators have despaired of formulating a
coherent theory of the implied immunity doctrine,2- and lower courts
are left with little or no guidance in deciding an immunity claim on
a particular set of facts.
But it is possible to distill from the Supreme Court's decisions all
the criteria which it has found relevant in determining whether anti-
trust immunity should be implied. Any claim of immunity which can
meet all of these criteria should certainly succeed. The case law sug-
gests five criteria for this strict test: (1) the conduct challenged in the
antitrust complaint, as well as rates, entry, and investment in the mar-
ket, should be continually subject to the supervisory authority of the
regulatory agency; (2) the agency should have the power to grant the
relief requested by the antitrust plaintiff; (3) the benefits of competi-
tion should enter into the agency's public interest calculation; (4)
agency expertise should be particularly useful in deciding issues in the
antitrust suit; and (5) the antitrust suit should involve important regu-
latory policy questions.
1. Supervisory Authority over Conduct
In the leading implied immunity case, Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc. v. United States,2  the Supreme Court reversed a judgment
against Pan American for violations of § 2 of the Sherman Act, ruling
that the complaint was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB). The Court stressed that the acts alleged
in the suit as antitrust violations were "precise ingredients" of the
CAB's regulatory authority.26 To satisfy this criterion, the conduct
22. United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 734 (1975).
23. See, e.g., p. 262 infra.
24. See Handler, supra note 13, at 290-92 (suggesting a national committee to study
the proper accommodation of regulation and the antitrust laws); Pogue, supra note 15,
at 317.
25. 371 U.S. 296 (1963). The Court remanded the case with an order that the com-
plaint be dismissed. See Note, Antitrust and the Regulated Industries: The Panagra De-
cision and its Ramifications, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 593 (1963). Pan Ain was the first case
in which the Court was clearly using the concept of exclusive agency jurisdiction, Id. at
604.
26. Specifically, the Court referred to the CAB's authority to grant certificates for
operation on assigned routes and to allow or disallow affiliations between common
carriers and air carriers. 371 U.S. at 305. See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 402-03 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The district court in Pan An had held that Pan American Airlines violated § 2 of
the Sherman Act in using its 50 percent ownership of Panagra Airlines to prevent Panagra
from securing authority from the CAB to extend its routes from the Canal Zone to
258
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at issue in the suit must be subject to the supervisory authority of the
relevant regulatory agency; in other words, the agency must have
authority to monitor the activity and to order that it be modified or
terminated.
2 7
Several cases suggest further that the agency's supervisory authority
must extend to essentially the type of regulation imposed on public
utilities,2'28 which has traditionally involved control over the rates,
entry, and investment of firms in the industry.2 9 This stricter re-
quirement of supervisory authority is in keeping with the concept
of "pervasive regulation." An agency which controls these market
variables can better shape the industry to meet the various policy
objectives implicit in the regulatory act's public interest standard.
the United States in competition with Pan Am. 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The
initial complaint also charged (1) that Pan Am and W.R. Grace & Co. formed Panagra
under an agreement that Panagra would have the exclusive right to traffic along the
west coast of South America while Pan Am, with no competition from Panagra, would
operate in other parts of South America and between the Canal Zone and the U.S.;
(2) that Grace conspired to monopolize and did monopolize air commerce between the
eastern coastal areas of the U.S. and the western coastal areas of South America and
Buenos Aires. 371 U.S. at 298.
27. The "precise ingredients" criterion was first stated in United States Navigation
Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932), a case involving an alleged combination and
conspiracy among certain shipping firms in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. The Court concluded that the matter was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Shipping Board. 284 U.S. at 485. The Supreme Court has subsequently suggested that
Cunard was a case of express, not implied, immunity under § 15 of the Shipping Act.
Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 220-21 (1966). However, the
Cunard Court did not rely on an express immunity theory. See United States Navigation
Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., supra at 486-87.
28. In United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334 (1959), the Supreme Court considered the
question whether the FCC's approval of an agreement to exchange television stations
barred a civil antitrust action by the Government. The Court ruled that it did not,
noting that most of the cases dealing with implied immunity concerned common car-
riers rather than broadcasters. Id. at 348. The Court observed that broadcasters are not
subject to the extensive controls, such as rate regulation, which typify common carrier
regulation, id. at 348-49, and reasoned that the failure to subject broadcasters to the
extensive regulation conventionally applied to common carriers necessarily implied that
Congress intended that the field of broadcasting be one of free competition. Id. at 3,19.
It held that the antitrust laws should therefore apply. Id. at 350.
In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 352 (1963), the Court re-
jected a claim of implied immunity, noting that "batik regulation is itJ most respects
less complete than public utility regulation" and that federal agencies had no authority
over inestinent and service and only indirect authority over rates.
It should be noted that the Court in RCA uses the term "primary jurisdiction" in-
stead of "implied immunity" or "exclusive jurisdiction." For a discussion of the con-
fusion involved in the use of these terms, see note 15 supra. It is obvious from the
references in RCA to two implied immunity cases, Keogh v. Chicago & N. Ry., 260 U.S.
156 (1922), and United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932),
that the Court was using the term "primary jurisdiction" in the sense of both primary
and exclusive jurisdiction. 358 U.S. at 347-48. A similar confusion exists in Philadelphia
National Bank. 374 U.S. at 353-54.
29. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 9, at 20-21. Authority over investment should include aum-
thority to order capacity expansions and generally to maintain the quality of service.
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If Congress failed to grant an agency authority over these variables,
it may not have intended to supplant conventional market forces and
displace the antitrust laws.
The supervisory authority criterion was emphasized in Hughes
Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 3 11 In holding that the CAB
had exclusive jurisdiction over the alleged anticompetitive conduct,
the Court relied on the fact that the conduct was continually subject
to the supervisory authority of the agency.3' Mere agency authority to
approve a firm's entry into the market, without the authority to moni-
tor its conduct, is not sufficient for antitrust immunity. But the Court
30. 409 U.S. 363 (1973). As Chief Justice Burger points out in his dissent, the acts
at issue in Hughes Tool were elements of an attempt to restrain trade in aircraft supply
and manufacturing. The CAB has no authority over entry, rates, or investment in this
market, and hence does not meet the more demanding requirement of supervisory at-
thority discussed at p. 259 supra. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
409 U.S. 363, 403 (1973) (Burger, C. J., dissenting); Handler, supra note 13, at 286.
31. TWA instituted this suit for treble the alleged damages resulting from the Hughes
Tool Company's exercise of its controlling interest in TWA from 1944 to 1960, in par-
ticular Hughes Tool's efforts to control the acquisition and financing of aircraft by
TVA. Under § 408 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970), the Civil
Aeronautics Board must approve the acquisition of control of an air carrier by any
person engaged in any phase of aeronautics. The Supreme Court held that this authority,
in conjunction with the CAB's ongoing supervisory authority tinder § 415 of the Act,
49 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970), placed the conduct at issue beyond the reach of the antitrust
laws. 409 U.S. at 389.
The fact that the Federal Aviation Act contains an express immunity provision, re-
ferred to in Hughes Tool, has created a great deal of confusion in the literature as to
whether Hughes Tool is an express or an implied immunity case. Compare Shenefield,
Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments-The Year of the Regulated Industry, 31 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1, 45 (1974), and Comment, Primary Jurisdiction in Antitrust Cases: Three
Recent Decisions, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 725, 738-40 (1973), with Pogue, supra note 15, at
320, and Comment, supra note 15, at 107.
The confusion stems from the fact that the Court did pursue both arguments. Section
414 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970), provides that any person af-
fected by an order under § 408, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970) (consolidation, merger, purchase,
lease, contracts to operate, or acquisition of control of air carriers), § 409, 49 U.S.C. § 1379
(1970) (interlocking relationships), or § 412, 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970) (pooling and other
agreements), is relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws insofar as necessary to
enable them to comply with the order. The Court made a determined effort to work
the fact situation in Hughes Tool into the express immunity framework of § 414 by
attempting to view all the transactions between Hughes Tool and TWA from 1944 to 1960
as part of the original 1944 order tinder § 408 permitting Hughes Tool to obtain de
facto control of TWA. 409 U.S. at 375-76, 379.
However, as Chief Justice Burger noted in his dissent, many of the actions alleged to
have damaged TWA were never reviewed by the CAB. Id. at 404 n.18. The Government
itself made this observation, Memorandum for CAB as Amicus Curiae at 9-15, which
seriously undermined the majority's contention that "[elach transaction was approved by
the Board and each approval was an order under § 408 . 409 U.S. at 379. In view
of these difficulties, the Court's references to the CAB's supervisory authority over the
control exercised by Hughes Tool years after the original CAB authorization appear
to be an attempt to fit Hughes Tool into the implied immunity formula of Pan Am,
a decision which is cited with approval throughout the opinion. See 409 U.S. at 388-89.
The Supreme Court has recently given support to this interpretation by citing Hughes
Tool as an implied immunity case. United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422
U.S. 694, 734-35 (1975).
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indicated in Hughes Tool that the CAB need not actually have ap-
proved the conduct at issue or even have been aware of it, so long as the
agency had the power to exercise control over the general class of
conduct if it chose to do so. 32 The Supreme Court has recently in-
dicated that the degTee to which an agency's supervisory authority is
exercised may be relevant to, although not necessary for, a finding
of implied immunity.33 Read together, the leading implied immunity
cases dealing with SEC and CAB regulation suggest that immunity re-
quires either evidence of active supervision or existence of a complaint
procedure by which an injured party may invoke the jurisdiction of
the agency.
34
32. See 409 U.S. at 385-86, 389. The importance of this supervisory authority criterion
was also emphasized in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). The
Government brought an antitrust suit against Otter Tail Power, an electric power com-
pany, to enjoin alleged violations of the Sherman Act, including Otter Tail's refusal to
sell power at wholesale to municipal systems in communities where it had previousl)
been selling at retail and its refusal to transfer ("wheel") power from other companies
oier its transmission facilities to these systems. The Supreme Court upheld the lower
court's finding that Otter Tail had violated § 2 of the Sherman Act.
The Court rightly dismissed the implied immunity defense as to "wheeling." The FPC
has no authority to order wheeling, 410 U.S. at 375, and therefore no supervisory au-
thority over refusals to wheel. The more interesting immunity question concerned the
refusal to sell power at wholesale. Otter Tail maintained that its refusal to deal with
the municipal companies should be immune from antitrust sanctions because the FPC
has the power to compel involuntary interconnections of power systems pursuant to
§ 202(b) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1970). The Court rejected
this argument, noting that the essential thrust of § 202 is to encourage voluntary
interconnections.
The Otter Tail Court's reading of the legislative history of the Federal Power Act
was that Congress had considered and rejected pervasive regulation. 410 U.S. at 374.
The FPC lacks authority over substantial elements of the commercial relationships
between Otter Tail and the municipal cooperatives and between those cooperatives and
their customers. The FPC has no control over the local distribution or generating plant
of any power company, including companies that engage in interstate transmission, and
has no control over the development of local cooperatives, their rates or, except insofar as
they seek interconnection with interstate companies, the percentage of their power re-
quirements to be produced by local generators. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1970); Jersey Cent.
Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 319 U.S. 61, 72 (1943). The FPC did not have control over
rates, entry, and investment in this retail power distribution market; therefore Otter
Tail could not meet the stricter supervisory authority requirement for its implied
immunity claim.
The FPC's lack of jurisdiction over wheeling may explain, in part, the Court's reluc-
tance to find that the agency had exclusive jurisdiction over interconnection. A power
company cannot wheel to a municipal cooperative with which it is not interconnected.
Since the courts could not order wheeling without in fact also ordering interconnection, it
would have been logically inconsistent for the Supreme Court to hold that the courts had
jurisdiction over wheeling while the FPC had exclusive jurisdiction over interconnection.
33. Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 685 (1975); United States v. National Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 734 (1975) (with respect to the count alleging a horizontal
conspiracy between NASD and its members).
34. In Pan Am and Hughes Tool the CAB did not even believe that it had the au-
thority to supervise the conduct at issue. See Memorandum for CAB as Amicus Curiae
at 9-18, Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Brief for
United States in Response in No. 23 at 42-43, Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.
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2. Agency Authority to Grant Relief
Another criterion for implied immunity found in Pan Am 35 and
other cases36 is that the agency have the power to grant the type of
relief requested in the antitrust suit. More recent cases have not sub-
scribed to this requirement. Hughes Too 3 7 and Gordon v. New
York Stock Exchange,38 for example, both involved private treble
damage actions in which the Supreme Court found exclusive juris-
diction in a regulatory agency not empowered to grant damages.30
United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963). This approach suggests a desire to focus on tile
agency's statutory authority and to leave to Congress assessments of the efficacy of the
regulators.
The discussion in Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 685 (1975), and United States v.
National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 734 (1975), of the SEC's exercise of
supervisory authority is not inconsistent with the lack of such a concern in Pan Ant
and Hughes Tool. In Gordon and NASD, the Court relied principally on its decision in
Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341 (1963). Silver involved an antitrust action brought against
the New York Stock Exchange by two nonmembers for alleged violations of § I of the
Sherman Act, centering on the Stock Exchange's order to its members to terminate their
direct wire telephone connections with the two nonmembers after the Exchange denied
the nonmembers approval for such connections. The Supreme Court held that the New
York Stock Exchange was not immune from the antitrust laws because the SEC did
not have jurisdiction to review particular instances of enforcement of Exchange rules.
The Silver Court pointed out that it would be a different case "were there Com-
mission jurisdiction and ensuing judicial review for scrutiny of a particular exchange
ruling, as there is under the 1938 Maloney Act amendments to the Exchange Act to
examine disciplinary action by a registered securities association," referring to 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78o-3(g), 78o-3(h), 78y(a) (1970). 373 U.S. at 358 n.12. Review under these sections is
triggered by the petition of any person aggrieved by the action. See R.H. Johnson & Co.
v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 855 (1952). Silver may be read as
holding that before a court infers antitrust immunity, it must find that a mechanism
exists by which the aggrieved party may invoke the jurisdiction of the regulatory agency.
Otherwise the agency might never review the conduct at issue. In Pan Am and Hughes
Tool such a complaint procedure was available by virtue of §§ 408(e) and 411 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1378(e), 1381 (1970). In Gordon and NASD
on the other hand, there appears to have been no such complaint procedure available.
See, e.g., Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 28, Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S.
659 (1975); cf. jurisdictional Statement at 25-28, United States v. National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975). Therefore, the Court looked for evidence of some
exercise of that authority with respect to the conduct at issue. Absent a complaint pro-
cedure this evidence afforded some assurance that the agency was aware of the problem
and could take action if it thought necessary. See Gordon v. NYSE, supra at 683-85.
35. 371 U.S. 296, 311-12, 313 n.19 (1963).
36. United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 734 (1975);
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 460 (1945); Terminal Warehouse Co. v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 297 U.S. 500, 514 (1936); Keogh v. Chicago & N. Ry., 260 U.S. 156,
162 (1922). For cases where the CAB's inability to grant a remedy resulted in retention
of jurisdiction by the courts, see Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 489
F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 913 (1974); Allied Air Freight, Inc. v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 393 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846 (1968). See
also Foremost Int'l Tours, Inc. v. Qantas Airways Ltd., 5 Ti.nDr REG. REP. (1975 Trade
Cas.) 60,578, at 67,535 (9th Cir., Oct. 22, 1975).
37. 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
38. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
39. Neither the CAB nor the SEC has authority to grant damages. Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 311 (1963); ThilI Sec. Corp. v. NYSE,
433 F.2d 264, 278 (7th Cir. 1970).
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The ability to grant most forms of injunctive relief is implicit in
the requirement of supervisory authority over conduct.40 Even if the
agency has supervisory authority over regulated firms, however, it
may not be able to order divestiture4 1 or to award damages. The in-
ference that Congress intended to displace conventional antitrust
remedies is certainly stronger if the agency is authorized to award
both of these additional forms of antitrust relief. 42 A strict test for
implied immunity should therefore include the remedy requirement.
3. Competition and the Public Interest
In Pan Am 4a and recently in Gordon and United States v. National
Association of Securities Dealers,4 4 the Court suggested that an im-
40. See pp. 258-59 supra.
41. The Court has indicated that the inability to grant divestiture may defeat an
implied immunity claim. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
296, 311-13, 313 n.19 (1963).
42. See Keogh v. Chicago & N. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1922).
43. 371 U.S. 296, 304-09 (1963).
44. Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 689-91 (1975); United States v. National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 732 (1975).
A strict version of this criterion is that an implied immunity argument can only suc-
ceed if a new competitive standard was explicitly written into the regulatory act. See
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372-75 (1973) (suggesting that anti-
trust considerations must be "determinative" in the agency's "public interest" standard
before that agency can be said to have exclusive jurisdiction over an antitrust controversy).
In his dissent in ANASD, Justice White argued that immunity can be inferred only
if Congre',s has displaced the unregulated market "with a differing competitive re-
gime, defined by particularized competitive standards." 422 U.S. 694, 743 (1975). Justice
White's test is heavily influenced by his reading of Pan Am and the very special
language in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 involved in that case. Id. at 740-41. Spe-
cifically, § 411 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970), gives the CAB
authority to investigate and remedy "unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of
competition." But the Federal Aviation Act was principally a reenactment of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, which was concerned with the problems of destructive com-
petition on the one hand, and complete monopolization of a then oligopolistic industry
on the other. See Jones, Antitrust and Specific Regulation: An Introduction to Compara-
tive Analysis, 19 A.B.A. ANnTRUsr SEcrioN 261, 305-09 (1961). Therefore it was quite
natural that provisions addressing monopoly and unfair methods of competition were
included in the Act. The Federal Aviation Act requires the CAB to foster competition.
Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 519 F.2d 944, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Consider, however, the application of the White test to the telephone industry, which
was conceded by Congress in 1934 to be a monopoly. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 781, 73d
Cong. 2d Sess. 2 (1934). Any real competition in the industry had ended years before-
with congressional approval. See Gabel, The Early Competitive Era in Telephone Com-
nunication, 1893-1920, 34 L.w & CONTEMP. PROB. 340, 355-58 (1969). It would have been
odd for Congress in 1934 to have included in the Communications Act a provision
concerning "unfair methods of competition" among the common carrier provisions of
the Communications Act, given that it had conceded the principle of regional monopolies
some 13 years before in the Willis-Graham Act of 1921, ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27. See generally
S. REP. No. 75, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); H.R. REP. No. 109, 67th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1921). And no such provisions exist. The White test would have the anomalous result
of displacing the antitrust laws in industries where Congress felt the competitive ideal
was still very important and retaining their applicability in industries where Congress
felt competition should not play a significant role.
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plied immunity claim is strengthened by a showing that the agency
considers the benefits of competition in regulating the industry in
the public interest. This emphasis on competition is difficult to justify.
Although competition is undoubtedly relevant to an agency's determi-
nation of the public interest,45 it is necessarily only one of many factors
in that determination. 4 Indeed, the reason Congress imposes regula-
tion on an industry is because unfettered competition does not ade-
quately serve broader policy objectives.
4. Agency Expertise
A consideration articulated in earlier implied immunity cases, 47 and
suggested in more recent ones,48 is whether the issues in the suit
involve questions requiring agency expertise concerning the regu-
lated industry. The rationale for this criterion is not simply that the
agency is a better factfinder than the court in a given controversy-
the rationale for the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; indeed, reliance
on agency expertise in the early implied immunity cases may be a
result of the courts' tendency to confuse the concepts of primary and
exclusive jurisdiction. 49 The principle behind judicial deference to
agency expertise in a finding of exclusive jurisdiction is one of prac-
tical accommodation between regulation and antitrust: when an agency
has the expertise to supervise an industry effectively, "continuing regu-
lation is a better calibrated tool for . ..controlling anti-competitive
behavior within an industry than the more blunt and generalized in-
strument of the antitrust laws." 0
5. Presence of Important Regulatory Policy Issues
The last and possibly most significant questions in weighing a case
for implied immunity underlie the decision in Pan A r5 and are
stated more explicitly in other cases: 2 whether the issues in the suit
45. Gulf State Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 756-62 (1973).
46. See FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1953).
47. Far East Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952); United States Navi-
gation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 482-83, 485 (1932).
48. See Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 689-90 (1975).
49. See notes 15, 28 supra.
50. Foremost Int'l Tours, Inc. v. Qantas Airways Ltd., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1975 Trade
Cas.) [ 60,578, at 67,535 (9th Cir., Oct. 22, 1975) (dicta).
51. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 307-10 (1963).
52. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 734-35
(1975) (repeal of the antitrust laws implied where necessary to make the regulatory
scheme work); United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334,' 346-52 (1959). The importance of
this criterion has received greatest emphasis in the "self-regulation" cases. See Ricci v.
Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973); Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 358 (1963)
(Court defined central issue as "the extent to which the character and objectives of tile
duty of exchange self-regulation contemplated by the Securities Exchange Act are in-
compatible with the maintenance of an antitrust action.")
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necessarily involve important questions of regulatory policy and, if
so, whether antitrust enforcement might seriously hamper, if not pre-
clude, realization of the agency's policy objectives under the public
interest standard.53 Implicit in this inquiry is the assumption that
Congress could not have intended to permit the antitrust laws to
hamper or foreclose the achievement of legitimate regulatory policy
objectives. The potential for collision with the regulatory scheme 54 is
inherent in the court's power to impose new behavioral patterns on
an industry in order to foster competition rather than to further the
public interest as defined by the agency. Under this last criterion,
the court asks whether the agency's exercise of its supervisory au-
thority under a different legal standard might lead to conflicting judg-
ments with significant ramifications for the industry and the public.
II. AT&T and Implied Immunity
A. Competition in Intercity Voice and Data Services
The origins of the Government suit as it relates to interstate tele-
communications services lie in an FCC decision to experiment with
competition in intercity private line services. In 1969 the FCC au-
thorized Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) to establish a low-
cost microwave transmission link between Chicago and St. Louis in
direct competition with the Bell System's private line services. 55 In
1971 the Commission announced a "general policy in favor of the entry
of new carriers in the specialized communications field." 0 The FCC's
53. United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 734-35 (1975).
54. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 309-11 (1963).
55. Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969). This was the first in-
stance of FCC authorization of a common carrier in competition with the established
telephone companies for private line voice and data traffic. (As opposed to conventional
dialed long distance service, a private line is dedicated solely to communication between
two or more locations specified by the customer. See AT&T, 34 F.C.C. 244, 250 (1961)).
The trend toward expanding the options available to communications users had begun
some years before. In 1959 the Commission for the first time permitted private users to
provide their own point-to-point microwave communication links. Allocation of Fre-
quencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959), modified, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960).
This privilege was enhanced by a later Commission order which allowed private users
to pool their resources and share a microwave link. Cooperative Sharing of Operational
Fixed Stations, 4 F.C.C.2d 406 (1966). See also Irwin, The Communication Industry and
the Policy of Competition, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 256 (1964). Although significant in prin-
ciple, these authorizations were of little practical importance because of the relatively
high cost and the coordination problems of private microwave systems.
56. Specialized Common Carrier Serv., 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 920 (1971), modified, 33
F.C.C.2d 408 (1972), aff'd sub nora. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513
F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975). For a general discussion of Spe-
cialized Common Carrier Services, see Note, Recent Federal Actions Affecting Long Dis-
tance Telecommunications: A Survey of Issues Concerning the Microwave Specialized Com-
mon Carrier Industry, 43 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 878 (1975).
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decision to experiment with competition in service lines traditionally
within the established common carriers' tariffs was prompted by com-
plaints from the computer industry that existing service offerings were
inadequate. 57 The entry of specialized carriers was authorized in order
to develop new telecommunications services neglected by the estab-
lished carriers. 5s
The decision to promote competition in private line services was
followed in June, 1972, by the FCC's announcement of the policies
which would govem domestic satellite authorizations.5" The FCC saw
domestic satellites as a means of providing the specialized carriers with
low cost transmission facilities, thereby enhancing their market via-
bility.60 Therefore the Commission restricted AT&T's use of satellites"'
in order to prevent AT&T from preempting the technology or from
using satellites to gain an unfair advantage in its competition with
the specialized carriers. 62 These and other FCC actions 3 have pre-
57. Computer service companies and user groups maintained that the telephone com-
panies were being unresponsive to the computer user's needs for specially engineered
data communications services. See Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29 F.C.C.2d 870,
893-96 (1971). See also D. DUNN, POLICY ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF
COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 52 (Stanford Research Institute Rep. No. 7379B-1,
1969). For a detailed compilation of computer industry complaints, see A. LIPINSKI, DMESTS
OF THE RESPONSES TO ThE FCC COMPUTER INQUIRY (Stanford Research Institute Rep. No.
7379B-5, 1969).
58. Specialized Common Carrier Serv., 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 906-07 (1971).
59. Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-govern-
mental Entities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, modified, 38 F.C.C.2d 665 (1972).
60. Establishment of Domestic Communication-Satellite Facilities by Nongovernmental
Entities, 22 F.C.C.2d 86, 95 (1970).
61. See Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-govern-
mental Entities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, modified, 38 F.C.C.2d 665 (1972).
62. The FCC decided to prohibit AT&T from providing specialized services over
satellite facilities for the first three years in which it uses domestic satellites or until
satellites serving the specialized carriers have enough business to operate at an efficient
level of output. 35 F.C.C.2d at 851-52. And in order to prevent total satellite preemption
by AT&T, the Commission ruled that it would permit concerns owning domestic satellites
to lease capacity to AT&T only up to a given percentage of their total capacity. Id. at
853, modified, 38 F.C.C.2d at 687-88. Lastly, to prevent sham competition, satellite
operators who decided to lease capacity to AT&T were prohibited from also offering end-
to-end specialized carrier service. 35 F.C.C.2d at 848-49 (discussion of Comsat/AT&T pro-
posal). This stricture was removed later in the year. 38 F.C.C.2d at 680-81, 688. See also
GTE Satellite Corp., 49 F.C.C.2d 42 (1974).
63. By December, 1973, there were applications for authorization to provide spe-
cialized carrier service to 200 cities. Commission Policies Governing the Licensing & Regu-
lation of Specialized Common Carriers, 44 F.C.C.2d 467, 472 (1973). The FCC has also
licensed miscellaneous and radio common carriers to compete with the Bell System in
the provision of audio and video program transmission services and intracity mobile
telephone services. See General Mobile Radio Serv., 13 F.C.C. 1190, 1219 (1949) (allo-
cation of frequencies for competitive mobile radio systems); Allocation of Frequencies in
150.8-162 Mc/s Band, 12 F.C.C.2d 841 (1968), aff'd sub nom. Radio Relay Corp. v. FCC,
409 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1969) (competition in providing paging services); Affidavit of John
C. Jones at 4-6, II Appendix Annexed to Defendants' Memorandum Submitted Pursuant
to the Court's Order of February 27, 1975, United States v. AT&T, Civil No. 74-1698
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sented AT&:T with its strongest competitive challenge since the turn
of the century. 4
AT&T has responded to the competition of the specialized carriers
with three complementary strategies. First, it has cut rates, removed
some restrictions on the manner in which a subscriber may use Bell
lines,G and adopted the "Hi-Lo" Tariff in an attempt to jettison the
constraints of nationvide cost-averaging. 60 Second, its operating com-
panies have delayed or refused the specialized carriers access to their
local distribution facilities.6 Third, AT&T has introduced new facili-
ties for data communications services to meet the objections of the
(D.D.C., filed Nov. 20, 1974) (competition in intercity program transmission services). A
miscellaneous common carrier is a common carrier engaged in the intercity transmission
of audio and video signals, principally by means of microwave. Id. at 4. A radio common
carrier normally provides two-way mobile radio service and one-way radio signalling
(paging) services within a locality. Id. at 2.
64. The FCC is currently considering an extension of its policy of encouraging com-
petition which would permit firms to lease network services from Bell and other carriers
at wholesale in order to resell those services to other users. American Trucking Ass'n,
47 F.C.C.2d 644 (1974); Note, Resale and Sharing of Private Line Communications Ser-
vices: A.T.-T. Restriction and FCC Regulation, 61 VA. L. Rrv. 679 (1975). A number
of authorizations of this character have already been made. See Telenet Communications
Corp., 46 F.C.C.2d 680 (1974); Graphnet Sys., Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 800 (1974); Packet Com-
munications Inc., 43 F.C.C.2d 922 (1973).
65. In July, 1972, AT&T reduced the rates on its "Dataphone" data sets by approxi-
mately 24 percent and filed tariffs permitting more flexible use of channel-deriving
equipment. AT&T-Long Lines Dep't, 39 F.C.C.2d 637 (1973). See also AT&T, Long
Lines Dep't, 53 F.C.C.2d 470 (1975). "Dataphone" is an AT&T trademark. A data set is
a device which performs the modulation/demodulation and control functions necessary
to provide compatible interconnection between computer and communications facilities.
See J. MARTIN, TELECOtMMUNICATIONS AND THE CO'MPUTER 101-02 (1969).
66. Each established carrier has historically priced its interstate services on the basis
of a nationwide averaging of its costs. For any given class of service, the rates are de-
signed to be uniform throughout the contiguous 48 states, although costs vary signifi-
cantly in serving different routes and different customers. AT&T, 44 F.C.C.2d 697 (1974).
Because the pricing policies of the established carriers are so constrained by nationwide
cost-averaging, these carriers charged that MCI and the other specialized carriers were
"cream-skimming," i.e., serving only high-density, low-cost routes and exploiting the lack
of any obligation to serve unprofitable routes. See Specialized Common Carrier Serv., 29
F.C.C.2d 870, 960-61 app. C (comments of AT&T).
In response to specialized carrier competition, AT&T introduced its controversial "Hi-
Lo" Tariff. AT&T, 43 F.C.C.2d 821 (1973). The "Hi-Lo" Tariff was designed to end
nationwide cost-averaging of private line services. Under the tariff, customers desiring
private line services between high-density traffic points utilizing the most efficient tech-
nology pay a lower rate than the user desiring service on lower density, costlier
routes. See AT&T, 55 F.C.C.2d 224, 227-30 (1975). In January, 1974, AT&T also filed
tariffs which applied the Hi-Lo rate structure to WATS service. AT&T, 46 F.C.C.2d 81
(1974). WVATS or "wide area telephone service" provides telephone service within a de-
fined geographical area at a flat fee per month or at a fee based on time in use as
opposed to time and distance. Id. at 81-82.
67. Since the specialized carriers do not presently have local distribution facilities,
their systems depend on interconnection with the local distribution systems of the es-
tablished carriers. The response of Bell Operating Companies has ranged from outright
refusal to interconnect to the delaying tactic of insisting that local state regulatory ap-
proval was necessary for interconnection. See Bell System Tariff Offerings of Local Dis-
tribution Facilities for Use by Other Common Carriers, 44 F.C.C.2d 245, 246-50 (1973).
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computer industry to the inadequate transmission capabilities of the
old private lines." In addition, its operating companies have allegedly
harassed customers of the specialized carriers with threats of economic
reprisals.0 9
B. Application of the Strict Test for Implied Immunity
The Government has alleged that AT&T has monopolized the rele-
vant telecommunications services submarket 70 by refusing to intercon-
68. In July, 1973, the FCC authorized AT&T to begin building its Digital Data S)stem
(DDS) network. AT&T, 41 F.C.C.2d 586 (1973). Since this network is engineered spe-
cifically for data transmission, it not only ensures fewer errors in transmission than
conventional "voice-grade" private lines, but it also requires less expensive terminal equip-
ment because it eliminates the need to convert from digital to analog signals for the
purpose of transmission. See AT&T, 50 F.C.C.2d 501, 502-03 (1974). For a discussion
of the distinction between digital and analog signalling, see Note, supra note 56, at 906-09.
In addition AT&T has accelerated its development of Dataphone sets by introducing
in each of the three years following the FCC's Specialized Common Carrier Serv.ices
decision a new Dataphone series characterized by higher bit speeds. (Bit speed refers
to the rate at which the data can be transmitted along the line.) AT&T, Long Lines
Dep't, 36 F.C.C.2d 498 (1972) (up to 2400 bits/second); 39 F.C.C.2d 637 (1973) (up to
4800 bits/second); 46 F.C.C.2d 90 (1974) (up to 9600 bits/second).
69. Hearings on S. 1167 Before the Subconum. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 3002 (1974) (Material Re-
lating to the Testimony of C.M. Huntley, Exhibit 3); Plaintiff's Memorandum of Point
& Authorities in Response to the Motion of the Court Regarding Certain Jurisdictional
and Other Issues (Mar. 24, 1975) at 13, United States v. AT&T, Civil No. 74-1698 (D.D.C.,
filed Nov. 20, 1974).
70. Complaint, supra note 2, at 11. The relevant market-that for interstate, intercity
voice and data communications-is a distinct submarket for antitrust purposes. Long-dis-
tance telecommunications service presents difficult problems of market definition because
the volume of communication between any two points is insensitive to rate changes for
communications service between other points. Therefore, the market delineation principle
of cross-elasticity of demand is of limited usefulness. See United States v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956). However, the Court has enunciated other
principles to aid in market definition. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). Applying Grinnell, 381
U.S. at 575-76, the relevant geographic market would be the national market. AT&T's Long
Lines Department operates the interstate network on a national level. Ratemaking and
planning are done on a nationwide basis, and all rates and terms of service are filed
with the FCC. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 69, at 3-4. Appl)ing Brown Shoe,
different submarkets can be defined for interstate and intrastate service. The ex-
istence of different regulatory authorities creates disparities between interstate and intra-
state service in rates, customer eligibility for different classes of service, and quality
of service, which would justify different submarket definitions even if the services weie
otherwise interchangeable. See B. BocK, MERGERS AND MARKETS 62-65 (1962); AT&T,
9 F.C.C.2d 30, 93-94 (1967).
The relevant product market must include both voice and data services. First, the
same facilities may be used to provide both services. A data user can choose between
a data set used in conjunction with a switched voice grade line, a data set used in
conjunction with a private voice grade line, or among any of a range of specially en-
gineered data lines of differing bandwidths. An individual interested in voice communi-
cation can use the switched network or utilize private lines. Second, whatever the
original intention of the FCC, it is clear that the specialized carriers are not providing
solely, or even primarily, data communications; a large percentage of their current
traffic is private line voice communication. See Commission Policies Governing the Li-
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nect with specialized and domestic satellite common carriers,7 ' by mak-
ing predatory price reductions with its TELPAK tariff,7 2 and by
engaging in a general course of anticompetitive conduct including
reciprocal buying agreements with its own customers, harassment of
customers of competitors, preemptive use of others' market ideas, and
abuse of the regulatory process. 73 A threshold question is whether this
conduct is immune from antitrust attack because of the FCC's regula-
tory authority in the telecommunications services submarket. The Com-
munications Act of 193474 does not expressly grant AT&T's Long Lines
Department and the Bell Operating Companies immunity from the
antitrust laws for the conduct challenged in the Government's suit.75
Nor does the legislative history of the Federal Communications Act
indicate how Congress intended the Act and the antitrust laws to be
reconciled. 70 Therefore, if AT&T's alleged monopolization of inter-
censing & Regulation of Specialized Common Carriers, 44 F.C.C.2d 467 (1973). See also
N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1975, at 56. For example, MCI's new Execunet service is very
similar to traditional dialed long-distance (MTS) service. See Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1975, at
4, col. 1. Third, there appears to be a significant cross-elasticity of demand between
private line, traditional MTS and WATS (defined note 66 supra) services. See NARUC
COMMa. ON COMMUNICATIONS, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ECONOMIC AND QUALITY OF SER-
VICE IMPAct ON TELEPHONE SERVICE SUBSCRIBERS RESULTING FROM THE INTERCONNECTION OF
SUBSCRIBER-PROVIDED EQUIPMENT TO THE PUBLIC SWITCHED NET-WORK, AND FROM1 COMPETITION
IN THE PROVISION OF TELECOMMUNIMATION SEnvicEs 4535 (May 15, 1974), in Hearings on S.
1167 Before the Subcommn. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Conln. on the Ju-
diciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 6, at 4460 (1974) [hereinafter cited at NARUC REPORT].
See also Note, supra note 64, at 694 n.59.
71. Complaint, supra note 2, at 12-13.
72. The Government refers to the tariff as "a startling reduction in price which
virtually eliminated the incentive for construction and use of private microwave systems."
Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 69, at 10. For a discussion of the TELPAK tariff,
see Trebing, Common Carrier Regulation-The Silent Crisis, 34 LAw &: CONTEMP. PROB.
299, 319-20 (1969).
73. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 69, at 13.
74. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
75. However, a merger transaction among telephone and telegraph companies ap-
proved by the FCC is immune. 47 U.S.C. §§ 221(a), 222(c)(1) (Supp. III 1973).
76. Regulation of the telecommunications common carrier industry dates back to
1910 and passage of the Mann-Elkins Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, ch.
309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544 (1910). This amendment extended the definition of common
carrier in the Interstate Commerce Act to telephone, telegraph, and cable companies.
The Bell System was not subject to effective regulation until 1934, S. REP. No. 781,
supra note 44, at 2; from 1910 to 1934 the ICC heard only four minor rate cases. Gabel,
supra note 44, at 357-58. The Mann-Elkins Amendment did not address the question
of conflict with the antitrust laws. See generally Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 69,
at 38-41. As was the case initially with railroads, see United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 314-15 (1897), courts must have assumed that the antitrust
laws were fully applicable.
Congress first granted express immunity from the antitrust laws to telephone common
carriers in the Willis-Graham Act of 1921, ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27, which exempted certain
mergers and acquisitions. The legislative history of the Willis-Graham Act indicates a
recognition that the economics of the telephone industry were such that competition
could be detrimental to the public and to the industry in some instances. See S. REP.
No. 75, supra note 44; H.R. RP. No. 109,. supra note 44. But the Act specifically
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 85: 254, 1975
state, intercity voice and data communication services is beyond the
reach of the antitrust laws, the immunity must be implied.-7 In this
critical submarket, AT&T's conduct would seem to qualify for anti-
trust immunity even under the strict test put forth in Part I above.
1. Supervisory Authority over Conduct
The FCC has supervisory authority over the conduct challenged in
the Government's claim of monopolization of the interstate telecom-
munications services submarket. The Commission has already acted to
compel AT&T to interconnect with the competing carriers,7s and has
shielded only approved property consolidations from the antitrust laus. No other ex-
press immunity provision for telephone companies was incorporated in the Communi-
cations Act of 1934. Nevertheless, the legislative history of that Act indicates congres-
sional acquiescence to the existing telephone monopoly. See S. REPt. No. 781, supra
at 2 (telephone business a monopoly and must therefore be effectively regulated). See
also H.R. REP. No. 59, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. (1932); Preliminary Report on Comnmuni-
cation Companies (Splawn Report), H.R. REP. No. 1273, 73d cong., 2d Scss., pt. 1, at
xxx-xxxi (1934). Defendants' Memorandum Submitted Pursuant to the Court's Order
of February 27, 1975, at 7-9, United States v. AT&T, Civil No. 74-1698 (D.D.C., filed Nov.
20, 1974).
Title II of the 1934 Act, dealing with common carriers, does not include a section
like that in Title III, 47 U.S.C. § 313 (1970), which expressly makes the antitrust
laws applicable to radio communication. Because a large percentage of voice and data
communication in the domestic common carrier industry is by means of microwave
radio, it might be argued that § 313 of the Federal Communications Act preserves the
applicability of the antitrust laws in the instant case. This argument creates a dis-
tinction among regulated firms based not on the service provided in the market but
on the mode of transmission, while the courts and the Commission have made dis-
tinctions in functional rather than technological terms, i.e., common carriers vs. broad-
casters as opposed to wire vs. radio. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309
U.S. 470, 474 (1940) ("[T]he Act recognizes that broadcasters are not common carriers
and are not to be dealt with as such. Thus trie Act recognizes that the field of broad-
casting is one of free competition.") The legislative history of § 15 of the Radio Act
of 1927, ch. 169, § 15, 44 Stat. 1168, the predecessor of § 313, does not evince congres-
sional intent to make the antitrust laws applicable to common carrier services by radio.
Compare 67 CONG. REC. 5557-59 (1926) (remarks of Rep. Johnson) and 67 CONG. Rrc.
5481-82 (1926) (remarks of Rep. Davis) with 67 CoNC. REc. 12616 (1926) (remarks of
Senator Dill).
The Supreme Court suggested in United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 346 (1959), that
even evidence that Congress did not intend to prevent enforcement of the antitrust
laws in the communications industry does not end the inquiry. If application of the
antitrust laws would seriously undermine a comprehensive regulatory scheme, the courts
may still defer to the Commission. Cf. id. at 346-52. In fact, the Court has inferred
immunity in two cases despite an express savings clause in the relcant act (49 U.S.C.
§ 1506 (Supp. III 1973)). Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363
(1973); Pan American World Airwa)s, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963). Hence
the existence of such a savings clause in the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1970),
is of little importance.
77. Recently the Ninth Circuit characterized the implied immunity doctrine as a
safeguard against undue interference of the antitrust laws with the regulatory scheme
of the Federal Communications Act. ITT v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 518 F.2d
913, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1975). But since General Telephone did not raise the implied im-
munity defense on appeal, the court did not consider it. Id. at 919.
78. In April, 1974, the FCC ordered AT&T to cease and desist from any conduct
which results in a denial of, or unreasonable delay in establishing, physical connections
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been actively concerned with Bell's TELPAK tariff. 79 The Commis-
sion has authority over the conduct challenged by the Government's
subsidiary allegations of reciprocity, preemption of product innova-
tions, and abuse of the regulatory process.so Indeed, it is currently in-
vestigating the interstate aspects of AT&:T's major competitive re-
sponses to the specialized common carriers.8' Finally, the FCC has
with the specialized carriers, or from employing any policy which would deny the spe-
cialized carriers interconnection services similar to those provided to the Long Lines De-
partment of AT&T. Bell System Tariff Offerings of Local Distribution Facilities for Use
by Other Common Carriers, 46 F.C.C.2d 413, aff'd sub nom. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC,
503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1026 (1975). The FCC has since dealt
with a number of instances of alleged failures to comply with this order. See, e.g., 48
F.C.C.2d 676 (1974); 48 F.C.C.2d 449 (1974). This order was followed by institution of an
investigation into the substantive provisions of all the Bell System tariffs offering in-
tercity and local distribution facilities for other carriers. AT&T, 47 F.C.C.2d 660, modified,
49 F.C.C.2d 729 (1974). The investigation was terminated with a formal settlement agree-
ment by AT&T and the specialized carriers. AT&T, 52 F.C.C.2d 727 (1975), appeal docket-
ed sub nom. Carpenter v. FCC, No. 75-1564 (D.C. Cir., filed June 6, 1975). The FCC
has promised to "closely monitor" implementation of the agreement. Id. at 733.
79. See Trebing, supra note 72, at 319-20; Note, supra note 64, at 689-92.
80. Insofar as threats of economic reprisals or forced reciprocal buying arrangements
affect the FCC's policy in promoting competition in intercity voice and data services,
the FCC would have jurisdiction pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1970) (unreasonable prac-
tice) and 47 U.S.C. § 202 (1970) (subjecting a person to any undue or unreasonable prej-
udice or disadvantage). See generally Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204 (1974), appeal
docheted sub noni. North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, No. 74-1220 (4th Cir., filed Feb.
27, 1974); Bunker-Ramo Corp., 38 F.C.C.2d 860 (1972) (remanding to Administrative Law
Judge an action by Bunker-Raino against its competitor Western Union alleging among
other conduct Western Union's refusal to maintain adequate transmission service to cus-
tomers using Bunker-Ramo terminal equipment); Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515
F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (discussion of FCC consideration of reciprocity allegations). The
FCC also has authority to enforce § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), pro-
hibiting reciprocal agreements which tend to substantially lessen competition. 15 U.S.C.
§ 21 (1970).
The FCC's authority o er investment and quality of ser ice, note 84 infra, enables
it to control new market offerings. The agency's domestic satellite regulations illustrate
how this authority can be used to prevent preemption of new technologies and services
by the established carriers. See note 62 supra. See also Mobile Radio Communications,
Inc., 29 F.C.C.2d 62 (1971) (illustration of FCC efforts to stem market preemption); FWS
Radio, Inc., 40 F.C.C.2d 680 (1973) (modif)ing ruling in Mobile Radio).
The FCC frequently deals with allegations of abuse of its own processes. See, e.g.,
Jacksonville Broadcasting Co., 34 F.C.C.2d 881 (1972); Sencland Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
28 F.C.C.2d 74 (1971). 47 U.S.C. §§ 202, 203, 205 (1970), contain penalties for failure to
comply fully with orders promulgated under these sections. See also 47 U.S.C. §§ 214,
219, 220, 312, 510 (Supp III 1973). This conclusion in no way conflicts with the Supreme
Court's holding in California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508 (1972),
that abuse of administrative process might constitute an antitrust violation. The question
whether that violation could be immunized by the agency's control over abuse of its
processes was not before the Court.
The FCC has recently indicated in its memorandum as amincus curiae in the AT&T
suit that it regards virtually all the conduct put in issue by the Government's complaint
and opening memorandum as within its jurisdiction. Memorandum of FCC as Amicus
Curiae at 28-29, United States v. AT&T, Civil No. 74-1698 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 20, 1974).
81. This has been virtually conceded by the Government. Transcript of Proceedings
(Hearing on Jurisdictional Issues, July 23, 1975) at 60-62, United States v. AT&T, Civil
No. 74-1698 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 20, 1974). In its opening memorandum, AT&T suggested
that aspects of the abuse of process and reciprocity allegations might be outside the
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pervasive tegulatory authority over the submarket through its control
of rates,82 entry,83 and investment.
84
The Government has argued that even if the FCC has authority to
supervise the conduct of the defendants, it does not have authority
over a conspiracy to engage in that conduct, 5 This argument is predi-
cated"0 on the Supreme Court's 1945 decision in Georgia v. Pennisyl-
vania Railroad Co., which is, however, easily distinguished."7 Moreover,
both Pan Am"8 and NASD89 dismissed conspiracy counts even though
the agency had no express authority to supervise agreements among
the alleged conspirators. 90 In both cases the Court did not distinguish
authority of the FCC, but emphatically withdrew the suggestion at oral argument. Id.
at 145. In Docket No. 19419 the FCC is examining allegations that AT&T's rates for
data sets are noncompensatory and predatory. AT&T, Long Lines Dep't, 46 F.C.C.2d 90,
91 (1974); 53 F.C.C.2d 470 (1975). The rates for AT&T's Dataphone Digital Service are
under investigation in Docket No. 20288. AT&T, 50 F.C.C.2d 501 (1974). (Dataplone
Digital Service is the tariff name given to private line service on AT&T's new Digital Data
System, see note 68 supra.) The Hi-Lo Tariff, supra note 66, is being investigated in
Docket No. 19919. AT&T, 44 F.C.C.2d 697 (1974). See also AT&T, 55 F.C.C.2d 224 (1975)
(interim decision).
82. The charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for a communications service
must be specified in the tariff. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1970). They must be just and rea-
sonable, id. § 201(b) and may not be unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory. Id. § 202.
The FCC has the authority to prescribe just and reasonable rates, classifications, practices,
or regulations when it finds those existing to be in violation of the Act. Id. § 205.
83. The FCC supervises entry into the telecommunications common carrier industry
pursuant to id. § 214. This section requires any interstate carrier to obtain a certificate
of public convenience and necessity before constructing a line which is not wholly in-
trastate.
84. A certificate of public convenience and necessity is required before the carrier
can undertake any reduction in service. Id. § 214(a). On its own initiatile or that of a
complaining party, the FCC may order a carrier to expand its facilities. Id. § 214(d).
The FCC's authority to dictate the terms and classifications of service, see note 82 supra,
allows it to control the quality of service and indirectly the investment necessary to
maintain that service.
The FCC has jurisdiction over every interstate call from terminal to terminal, including
the telephone set or other station equipment. See United States v. AT&T, 57 F. Supp. 451
(S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd per curi am sub nora7. Hotel Astor, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S.
837 (1945); United States Dep't of Defense v. General Tel. Co., 38 F.C.C.2d 803, 809
(1973). The only interstate service subject to state regulation is local exchange service
at border areas. 47 U.S.C. § 221(b) (1970).
85. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 69, at 37.
86. Id.
87. 324 U.S. 439 (1945). The basis for the decision in Georgia was not that the
agency lacked supervisory authority over the defendants' conduct but that it lacked the
authority to grant the injunctive relief requested in the antitrust suit. Id. at 453, 455.
Following Keogh v. Chicago & N. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), the Court held that the
district court had jurisdiction of an antitrust claim by the State of Georgia for injunctive
relief against a conspiracy to fix railroad freight rates, because the Interstate Commerce
Commission had no authority to enjoin the carriers from fixing rates. 324 U.S. at 457-58.
88. 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
89. 95 S. Ct. 2427 (1975).
90. See Brief for the United States in Response in No. 23 at 37, 43, Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); Brief for United States at 62-63,
United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975). In each case the
Government argued that Georgia v. Pennsyhania Railroad Co. defeated the implied
immunity claim.
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between supervisory authority over overt acts in a conspiracy and the
conspiracy itself.91 Pan Am and NASD indicate that so long as the
agency has authority over the overt acts at issue in the antitrust suit,
its lack of authority over agreements to do those acts will not defeat
a claim of implied immunity.02 Even if authority over agreements
among regulated firms and their subsidiaries were necessary, the FCC
would seem to possess that authority with respect to a conspiracy among
AT&T and its subsidiaries-Western Electric, Bell Laboratories, and
the Bell Operating Companies.
93
Another argument is that the implied immunity doctrine does not
extend to activity found unlawful by the agency-a position the Govern-
ment contends94 is supported by Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Ex-
changeO5 But the Court in Ricci did not reach the defendant's im-
plied immunity contention,90 and in none of the implied immunity
91. See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 730-35 (1975);
Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 325-26, 326 n.2
(Brennan, J., dissenting, expressing dissatisfaction with Court's handling of Georgia v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.).
92. See also Carter v. AT&T, 365 F.2d 486, 492-94 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1008 (1967) (allegation of industry conspiracy to adopt telephone tariff does not
undermine defense that FCC approved tariff); von Mehren, supra note 15, at 937 (reading
Keogh v. Chicago & N. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), as rejecting, for acts within the purview
of regulatory statutes, the doctrine that conspiracy will make illegal under the antitrust
laws acts which are otherwise legal).
Related to the Government's conspiracy argument is its contention that if AT&T's
individual acts, although legal in isolation, were part of an overall plan which showed
an "intent to monopolize," there is no implied immunity defense. Transcript, supra
note 81, at 64-67. But in implied immunity cases, the Supreme Court has never con-
cerned itself with questions of intent. The argument that an illegal intent can defeat
an immunity claim confuses the standards for an exemption from the antitrust laws
with the standards for a violation of those laws assuming an exemption does not exist.
Cf. Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 687-88 (1975); Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963).
To disallow the immunity defense where intent to monopolize or to restrain trade is
alleged would virtually destroy the implied immunity doctrine, since Sherman Act suits
almost always involve allegations of specific intent.
93. The FCC has extensive authority to alter the market relationships of regulated
firms with their subsidiaries and each other. See GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 721
(2d Cir. 1973); General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971). The FCC
also has express authority over vertical and horizontal agreements. See 47 U.S.C. § 211
(1970) (carrier must file copies of all contracts, agreements, or arrangements with other
carriers unless expressly exempted); id. § 218 (gives Commission broad authority to in-
quire into management of a carrier); id. § 215 (agency has broad authority to inquire
into transactions of regulated common carriers). The FCC is presently engaged in an
extensive investigation of the vertical relationship between the Bell System Operating
Companies and Western Electric. See AT&T, 27 F.C.C.2d 151 (1971). See also Affidavit
of Frederick J. Coper, I Appendix, supra note 63.
94. See, e.g., Transcript, supra note 81, at 124.
95. 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
96. In Ricci, the plaintiff alleged that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and others
had conspired to restrain the plaintiff's business by transferring his membership to
another in violation of Exchange rules and the Commodity Exchange Act. The Supreme
Court upheld the district court's stay of the antitrust action until the Commodity Ex-
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cases has it prejudged the question of the lawfulness under the regu-
latory act of the conduct at issue in the antitrust suit.97
2. FCC Authority to Grant Requested Relief
The Government's suit seeks both injunctive relief and the separa-
tion of all or part of the Long Lines Department of AT&T from some
or all of the Bell Operating Companies.98 Since the FCC has statutory
authority to grant injunctive relief,9 9 the only difficult inquiry under
this criterion is whether the FCC has the power to order divestiture.
The existence of the Commission's divestiture authority is supported
by General Telephone Co. v. United States,100 in which the Fifth
Circuit upheld the FCC's authority to prohibit telephone companies
from furnishing cable television service in their telephone service
areas. The court relied on §§ 214101 and 4(i)102 of the Federal Com-
munications Act, which give the FCC general authority to authorize
the establishment of interstate telecommunication lines and to issue
necessary rules and orders. 03 The court recognized that the FCC was
applying its orders retroactively and, therefore, essentially ordering
divestiture. 104
change Commission passed on the legality of the defendants' conduct under the Act.
The Government seeks to rely on dicta that if the Commission found that the conduct
violated the Commodity Exchange Act, then the antitrust action should probably pro-
ceed, absent more compelling evidence of the exclusive jurisdiction of the agency. Id.
at 304.
The Government's interpretation of the Ricci dicta would eliminate the implied ijm-
munity criterion that the agency be able to afford the remedy sought. If the conduct
challenged in the antitrust suit is lawful under the regulatory statute, the agency of
course cannot apply a remedy; if the conduct is illegal, the immunity defense would be
unavailable. There is, however, an interpretation of the Ricci dicta more consistent with
cases where the Court has inquired into the agency's authority to grant a renedy,
pp. 262-63 & note 36 supra. The Court's reluctance to find exclusive jurisdiction might
be explained by the fact that Ricci sought treble damages as well as injunctive relief and
that the Commodity Exchange Commission cannot award damages. See Ricci v. Chicago
Mercantile Exch., 447 F.2d 713, 717-18, 720 (7th Cir. 1971).
97. To the extent that the existence of a complaint procedure is important for the
satisfaction of the supervisory authority criterion, see note 34 supra, such a procedure
is available. The Government could have invoked the jurisdiction of the FCC under § 208
of the Communications Act of 1934. 47 U.S.C. § 208 (1970). The essence of the Govern-
ment's claims with respect to the telecommunications services submarket could be ex-
pressed as allegations of violations of §§ 201, 202 and 214 of that Act. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201,
202, 214 (1970).
98. Complaint, supra note 2, at 14-15.
99. The FCC has express authority to issue cease and desist orders. 47 U.S.C. § 312(b)
(1970). See pp. 263, 270-72 supra.
100. 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
101. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1970).
102. Id. § 154(i).
103. 449 F.2d at 854.
104. Id. at 863-64 ("new rules may abolish or modify pre-existing interests"), quoted
with approval, United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 4G6 U.S. 649, 674 n.31 (1972).
See Petitions from Tel. Common Carriers & Cable Television Sys. Operators, 50 F.C.C.2d
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In the instant case, the logic of General Telephone would support
a divestiture order by the FCC under the line authorization power
of § 214. Moreover, approximately 69 percent of the circuit miles of
long distance carrier facilities in the Bell System are microwave links. 10
The FCC could use its radio licensing authority over these links to
reallocate market shares in interstate communication service by re-
fusing to renew AT&T's licenses and by accepting applications from
others to operate the routes.100 The FCC is in fact now considering
whether it should order the divestiture of AT&T's Long Lines De-
partment. 0
7
3. Competition and the Public Interest
The courts have consistently stressed the importance of competition
in the FCC's determination of the public interest under the Federal
Communications Act.ios Indeed, the actions by AT&T which gave rise
to the Government's claim of monopolization in the telecommunica-
tions services submarket were a response to the FCC's policy of en-
couraging competition from specialized carriers. 00 The FCC has even
been reversed by the Court of Appeals for giving too much weight to
the policy of competition in regulating common carriers." 0
156 (1974). In some cases the FCC has insisted on a rigid separation between com-
mon carriers ..nd their subsidiaries. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir.
1973) (upholding FCC authority to order common carriers to deal at arms length with
data processing affiliates); Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency Band
806-960 MHz, 46 F.C.C.2d 752 (1974), modified, 51 F.C.C.2d 945 (1975) (arms length ap-
proach applied in radio common carrier area). Moreover, § 11 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 21 (1970), expressly empowers the FCC to order divestiture in enforcing §§ 2,
3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act against regulated carriers. See CML Satellite Corp., 51
F.C.C.2d 14, 39-40 (1975), appeal docketed sub nora. RCA Global Communications Corp.
v. FCC, No. 75-1236 (D.C. Cir., filed Mar. 10, 1975) (Commission will enforce § 7 under
its broad public interest standard).
On the authority of a federal agency generally to order divestiture, see Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 311-12 (1963) (CAB has power to order
divestiture despite lack of explicit grant of such authority in Federal Aviation Act);
Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115 (1962); Note, Implied Power of
Federal Agencies to Order Divestiture, 39 NOrRE DAME LAW. 581 (1964).
105. NARUC REI'ORT, supra note 70, at 4529.
106. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307 (Supp. III 1973). Currently licenses for common
carrier point-to-point microwave services must be reviewed every five years. 47 C.F.R.
§ 21.35 (1974).
107. Economic Implications & Interrelationships Arising from Policies & Practices Re-
latihig to Customer Interconnection, Jurisdictional Separations & Rate Structures, 46
F.C.C.2d 214 (1974); 50 F.C.C.2d 574, 578-79 (1974).
108. See, e.g., FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 94 (1953); Hawaiian
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1974); General Tel. Co. v. United States,
449 F.2d 846, 857 (5th Cir. 1971).
109. See Panel, The Role of Competition in Transportation and Communications, 39
AxyrrRusr L.J. 465, 476-77 (1970); Note, supra note 56, at 692-94; pp. 265-68 supra.
110. Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Commission did not
meet its statutory obligation to consider the "public convenience and necessity" whcn it
did no more than equate the public interest with more competition).
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4. FCC Expertise in the Communications Industiy
The legality of AT&T's conduct, whether judged under the Sherman
Act or the Federal Communications Act, depends on several basic fac-
tual issues which require the FCC's expertise in the communications in-
dustry for proper resolution. The reasonableness of AT&,T's price re-
ductions depends on difficult marginal and average cost calculations."'
The FCC's familiarity with the technology and its experience in rate-
making render it better equipped than a court to determine whether
given rates are in some sense "compensatory."" ' 2 The reasonableness of
AT&T's refusals to interconnect with competing carriers depends in
large part on technical engineering questions which the courts are also
ill-equipped to decide. 113 In the last 10 years the courts have frequently
deferred to the FCC's technical expertise on the question of the rea-
sonableness of refusals to interconnect With specialized carriers or with
customers who provide their own terminal equipment.'
1 4
Finally, AT&T will probably resist divestiture of its Long Lines
Department by arguing that its entire complex of telecommunications
services is a natural monopoly which cannot be broken up without
great losses in efficiency. This issue involves even more difficult cost
computations than the predatory pricing issue. A predatory pricing
inquiry focuses on the costs for a given firm of the incremental unit
of output at its current output level. The critical characteristic of
natural monopoly, however, is the existence of decreasing average
costs over the entire range of output demanded by consumers; hence
the inquiry requires a determination of the average cost for the
most efficient firm at each possible rate of output up to the total de-
mand of the market.1 In Docket No. 20003 the FCC is attempting to
111. See Arceda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975) (test for predatory pricing should be
price less than short run marginal cost); Note, Telex v. IBM: Monopoly Pricing Undcr
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 84 YXALE L.J. 558 (1975). The determination of the marginal
cost of production for a firm is difficult in any context, but the difficulty is exacelbated
in the case of AT&T by pervasive common costs, %ariation in costs of scrlice with time
of day, complex technology, and conceptual difficulties in defining the unit of output.
And the existence of common and joint capital costs makes average cost even mole diffi-
cult to calculate. See I A. KAHN, supra note 9, at 63-86; Vickrey, Responsive Pricing of
Public Utility Services, 2 BEr. J. ECON. & M. Sci. 337 (1971).
112. A statement of principles to be used in pricing specific telecomnincation ser-
vices under competitive conditions is under consideration in Phase II of Docket No.
18129, now pending before the FCC. AT&T, 38 F.C.C.2d 213, 216-17 (1972).
113. See, e.g., MCI Communication Corp. v. AT&T, 496 F.2d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 1974).
For a discussion of some of the technical issues involved in interconnection of customer-
owned equipment, see National Academy of Sciences, A Technical Analysis of the Con-
mon Carrier/User Interconnection Area, June 1970, reprinted in Affidavit of Scott
Sheperd, II Appendix, supra note 63, Attachment K.
114. See, e.g., MCI Communication Corp. v. AT&T, 496 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1974).
115. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 9, at 119; 1 A. KAHN, supra at 124 n.3.
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define the extent of any natural monopoly in telecommunications ser-
vices;" 6 the courts should leave this determination to the Commission.
5. Issues of Regulatory Policy in the Communications Industry
The Government's suit involves basic questions of regulatory policy
in the communications industry.1 7 Established carriers have argued
that competition from specialized common carriers has forced them to
abandon nationwide cost-averaging for interstate services." 8 The state
regulatory authorities have argued that competition will destroy the
revenue contribution to local telephone service and intrastate toll ser-
vices made by interstate toll telecommunications services." 9 Increased
competition in interstate services forces Bell to lower its interstate rates,
which in turn forces it to increase intrastate rates-in particular, local
telephone rates and connection fees." -'0 State regulators argue that this
116. Economic Implications & Interrelationships Arising from Policies & Practices Re-
lating to Customer Interconnection, Jurisdictional Separations & Rate Structures, 50
F.C.C.2d 574, 577-78 (1974).
117. See FCC Memorandum, supra note 80, at 15, 25. In antitrust actions involving
customer-provided terminal equipment and radio common carriers, courts have used a
primary jurisdiction referral, see note 15 supra, to the FCC for guidance on the character
and significance of the regulatory policy questions involved in the suit. Carter v. AT&T,
365 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1008 (1967); Macom Products Corp.
v. AT&T, 359 F. Supp. 973 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (immunity defense disfavored); Chastain v.
AT&:T, 351 F. Supp. 1320 (D.D.C. 1972). See also Industrial Communications Sys., Inc. v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 505 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1974) (primary jurisdiction referral to Cali-
fornia Public Utilities Commission).
118. See note 66 supra. Some of the policy objectives behind cost-averaging were
articulated by Hearing Examiner Herbert Sharfman. Among them are simplicity in ad-
ministration of the tariff, easier customer understanding of the rate structure, and
spreading of benefits of efficiencies and economies to all subscribers of a service rather
than simply to those who are in a less costly location to serve. Microwave Communica-
tions, Ifc., 18 F.C.C.2d 979, 987 (1967) (Initial Decision of Hearing Examiner Herbert
Sharfman). See Note, supra note 64, at 687.
119. See NARUC REPORT, supra note 70, at 4534-47. The FCC generally allows a
higher rate of return on the Bell S)stem's interstate operations than state regulatory
authorities allow on intrastate operations. Compare, e.g., AT&T, 9 F.C.C.2d 30, 88 (1967)
(fair rate of return on AT&T's interstate operations is in the range of seven to 7 per-
cent), with 66-70 P.U.R.3d Index-Digest, Return § 111 (1967) (rates of return allowed for
particular telephone utilities). The principal, and subtler, mechanism by which the FCC
creates these subsidies is its authority pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 221(c)-(d) (1970) to value
the property used by carriers for interstate services. The value of this property is the
"rate base" to which a rate of return approved by the Commission is applied to de-
termine the rates for interstate telecommunications services. See Cunningham, The
Anatomy of a Utility Rate Case, in THE NEW ECONOsIcs OF REGULATED INDUSTRIES:
RATE-MAKING IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY 21 (J. Haring ed. 1968). Since state regulatory
agencies use a similar ratemaking procedure and since much of the Bell System telephone
plant is used to provide both interstate and intrastate services, the relative rates for
interstate and intrastate services can be altered by changing the interstate rate base. The
more of the Bell System's capital in the interstate rate base, the-lower intrastate rates.
See Boritzki, Settlements and Separations, PUBLIC UTIL. FORT, Oct. 10, 1974, at 27.
120. See SYsTEMs APPLICATION, INC., REGULATORY POLICY CHANGES AND THE FUTURE
or THE INDEPENDENT TELEPHONE INDUSTRY 6-8 (1975); Baer & Mitchell, Impact of Com-
petition on an Independent Telephone Company, PUBLIC UTIL. FORT., Oct. 23, 1975, at
23, 27-28.
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result shifts the costs of telephone service from higher income to lower
income consumers and undermines the national goal of a nationwide
network with which any user can interconnect at modest cost.
1 2 '
The FCC is currently reassessing its pro-competitive policy in private
line communications services.' 2 2 The Commission has noted that its
assessment of this policy depends upon whether it finds that the public
interest is served by subsidizing some consumers at the expense of
others. 2 3 These cross-subsidies are necessarily internal (intracorporate)
subsidies because the regulatory agency has a ratemaking, not a taxing
power.1
2 4
The divestiture of AT&T's Long Lines Department would enhance
competitive pressure. on nationwide cost-averaging, and would make
difficult, if not impossible, 12 5 the subsidization of intrastate consumers
by interstate consumers. These developments are likely to benefit
business users at the expense of residential users, urban users at the ex-
pense of rural, and those who frequently call long-distance at the ex-
pense of those who do not. Perhaps this is a proper state of affairs.'-'
But it should result from an informed balancing of policy alternatives
by the regulatory agency, not from an antitrust decree.
Divestiture of Long Lines may also disrupt the FCC's long range
planning for the structure of the national communications network.
In its current inquiry into the limits of natural monopoly in tele-
communications, the Commission intends to examine the probable
impact of new technologies and the potential benefits of restructuring
AT&T. 127 New technologies such as the laser may allow a single car-
rier to realize enormous economies of scale through increased use of
121. NARUC REPORT, supra note 70, at 4480-81.
122. Economic Implications & Interrelationships Arising from Policies & Practices Re-
lating to Customer Interconnection, Jurisdictional Separations & Rate-Structures, 46
F.C.C.2d 214 (1974).
123. See id. at 214-16. For a discussion of cross-subsidies as one function of a regulatoiy
agency, see Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & M. Sci. 22 (1971). See also
Waverman, The Regulation of Intercity Telecommunication, in PROMOTING COMPLrIION
IN REGULATED MARKETS 201, 233-37 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
124. The Commission can set rates which yield different profit margins on two
services offered by the same regulated firm. But it cannot order one regulated firm to
price its service well in excess of cost and appropriate these supernosmal profits to sub-
sidize another firm whose rates are held below cost.
125. The difficulty arises because the Long Lines Department and the Operating
Companies will no longer be under common ownership and hence their investment will
no longer be pooled to determine interstate rates. See note 119 supra. See also Hallingby,
The Case for Keeping American Telephone Intact, PUBLIC UrIL. FORt., Jan. 16, 1975,
at 15, 18 (divestiture of Long Lines would make the planning and engineering of the
national network more expensive).
126. See I A. KAHN, supra note 9, at 54-57.
127. Economic Implications & Interrelationships Arising from Policies & Practices Re-
lating to Customer Interconnection, Jurisdictional Separations k Rate Structures, 50
F.C.C.2d 574, 577-79 (1974).
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intermediate switching and toll route concentration. 128 The economies
of scale made possible by new technologies may in the future broaden
the scope of the existing natural monopoly in communications and
render inappropriate the Commission's current emphasis on com-
petition.
The injunctive relief sought by the Government against AT&T's
product innovations, rate reductions, and refusals to interconnect
would also interfere with the FCC's attempts to monitor competition
among carriers. For example, both the court and the agency may pre-
scribe the terms and conditions on which interconnection will occur.
1'20
The communications industry is undergoing a period of extraordi-
nary technological progress. Most observers have stressed that the po-
tential of the new information technology will not be realized if its
development is left to the market, and have emphasized the need for
a coherent and innovative approach to regulation in the industry. 30
AT&T bulks largest in the industry, and a decision to dismantle its
telephone monopoly should be made by that body best equipped to
shape the industry in the public interest-the FCC.
128. See J. MARTIN, supra note 65, at 156-61; Waverman, supra note 123, at 221-24.
The complexities of providing integrated service through intermediate switching and toll
route concentration are probably best handled by a single supplier. See Establishment
of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Nongovernmental Entities, 35 F.C.C.2d
844, 853-54 (1972). See generally Barrow & Manelli, Communications Technology-A Fore-
cast of Change (Part 1), 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 205 (1969).
129. See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 496 F.2d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1974) ("Such
a determination [of the reasonableness of a refusal to interconnect], involving, as it must,
the comparative evaluation of complex technical, economic, and policy factors, as well
ai consideration of the public interest, should be made, in the first instance, by the
administrative agency which has been entrusted with the primary responsibility for
making such a determination and which has the expertise necessary for the development
of sound regulatory policy."); FCC Memorandum, supra note 80, at 15.
130. See generally R. SNiTS!, THE WIRED NATION (1972); Barnett & Greenberg, A Pro-
posal for Wired City Television, 1968 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1 (1968); Parker & Dunn, Information
Technology: Its Social Potential, 176 SCIENCE 1392 (1972).
